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Boosting the Earnings and 
Employment of Low-Skilled 
Workers in the United States
Making Work Pay and Removing Barriers 
to Employment and Social Mobility
Steven Raphael
University of California, Berkeley
The last few decades of the twentieth century witnessed fairly dra-
matic changes in the labor market outcomes and socioeconomic status 
of American workers at the bottom of the earnings distribution. Earn-
ings of the least skilled adults either stagnated or fell. Moreover, labor 
force participation and employment have declined considerably, sug-
gesting a reduction in demand for the labor of the least skilled and an 
accompanying withdrawal from the labor force on the part of many 
low-skilled workers unwilling to accept diminished wages.
Certain economy-wide developments have affected the employment 
prospects of all low-skilled workers regardless of race or gender. For 
example, the well-documented changes in the earnings distribution be-
ginning in the late 1970s have increased the relative returns to postsec-
ondary schooling as well as the returns to experience (Katz and Autor 
1999).1 Nonetheless, certain social and institutional developments are 
likely to have had disproportionate impacts on the labor market pros-
pects of certain subgroups within the population of low-skilled adults. 
For example, the prison incarceration rate between the late 1970s and 
the present more than quadrupled. That has had a disproportionate im-
pact on less-educated black men and has left in its wake large groups 
of less-educated men who are hampered by their criminal histories in 
their search for employment.2 As a further example, the expansion of 
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), welfare reform, the Medicaid 
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expansions, and the introduction of the State Children’s Health Insur-
ance program (SCHIP) greatly increased the relative returns to work 
over welfare for poor women with children.
This chapter documents the relative economic performance of low-
skilled disadvantaged workers in the United States and identifi es key 
factors that have either enhanced their economic security or that are 
becoming increasingly important barriers to steady employment and 
self-suffi ciency. As the introduction suggests, there are important dif-
ferences by gender. Low-skilled men are currently participating in the 
labor force at rates that are extremely low by historical comparison, 
which suggests that procuring and maintaining steady employment has 
become a serious problem for this particular group. The analysis be-
low demonstrates that the unprecedented decline in employment and 
participation among men is only partially explained by the decline in 
earnings potential. Thus, boosting the employment rates of low-skilled 
men will require both supply-side incentives that make work pay and 
demand-side efforts aimed at increasing employer willingness to hire 
from this particular labor pool.
Low-skilled women have fared better in recent decades, experienc-
ing more modest declines in earnings and changes in employment rang-
ing from modest decreases to substantial increases. The greatest gains 
in employment are found for those women most likely to have been 
affected by the institutional changes to the nation’s safety net during the 
1990s, in particular poor and near-poor women with children.
I analyze and offer several policy proposals designed to boost the 
employment and earnings of the least-skilled workers. First, I discuss 
several recent proposals to substantially expand the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) for childless adults. I analyze the likely costs of these 
proposals, the degree to which the expansions would actually benefi t 
workers at the bottom of the income distribution, the potential effect 
of such expansions on the incentive to marry, and the likely impact on 
take-home earnings and employment. My preferred proposal is a hybrid 
of two proposals, one by Edelman, Holzer, and Offner (2006) and the 
other by Berlin (2007). It combines an expanded credit for childless 
adults with a targeted liberalization of the benefi ts calculation for the 
poorest married couples. While the employment effects of such an ex-
pansion are likely to be modest, the impact on annual income and mate-
rial poverty is substantial and would go part of the way toward reducing 
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the real decline in earnings experienced by low-skilled workers over 
the past three decades. Moreover, modest changes to the current system 
could eliminate the marriage penalty inherent in the EITC for the poor-
est couples at relatively little public expense.
Second, I offer several policy proposals intended to remove some 
of the educational and employment barriers that hinder the reentry of 
former prison inmates into mainstream society. Specifi cally, I propose 
that 
• Summary disqualifi cation of former inmates and those with fel-
ony convictions from participating in federal public assistance 
programs and from receiving fi nancial aid for education should 
be reversed.
• Employment bans based on former convictions and occupational 
licensing restrictions should be based on the content of one’s 
criminal record and not applied in a blanket manner. Moreover, 
when used, employment bans should be based on conviction 
rather than arrest records. Any bans on the employment of felons 
mandated by law should be based on the content of one’s previ-
ous behavior as well as the time that has elapsed.
• We should increase investment in labor market intermediaries 
that specialize in building relationships with employers willing 
to hire ex-offenders and in placing former inmates into sustain-
able employment.
• States should incentivize desistance from criminal activity by 
expunging certain criminal records after a fi xed time period has 
elapsed. 
While the challenges faced by former inmates in the legitimate la-
bor market are many, these modest proposals would eliminate key bar-
riers to employment that affect increasing proportions of low-skilled 
men, at little cost in terms of public safety. 
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WHO ARE THE LOW-EARNERS IN THE UNITED STATES 
AND HOW HAVE THEY FARED?
Here I use data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Public Use Micro-
data Samples (PUMS) from the U.S. Census of Housing and Popula-
tion to characterize the low-wage population and to document recent 
trends in earnings, employment, and institutionalization rates. I restrict 
the analysis to adults 18 to 55 years of age that are out of school, that 
are not in the military, and that do not report self-employment income. 
I measure each person’s hourly earnings by dividing total annual wage 
and salary earnings by total annual hours worked (measured by weeks 
worked last year multiplied by usual hours worked). For those individu-
als who did not work in the previous year or who are institutionalized 
at the time of interview, I compute hourly earnings by assigning the 
median hourly wage for workers in the same year, gender, race or eth-
nicity, education, and labor market experience group.3 Thus, average 
wages for all workers in the sample measure the actual wages for some 
and the potential earnings of those who do not participate in the labor 
force, based on the earnings of comparable individuals employed at 
some point during the year. 
An important strength of the PUMS data concerns the fact that the 
data covers the institutionalized population (including inmates in jails 
and prisons and inpatients in mental hospitals) as well as the noninsti-
tutionalized. As I discuss below, the institutionalized population now 
makes up a sizable proportion of many demographic subgroups among 
the low-skilled adult population. Thus, the ability to characterize insti-
tutionalization trends is central to fully comprehending the current state 
of the low-skilled adult population in the United States.
Who Are the Low-Earning Adults in the United States? 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 describe how the distributions of the male (Table 
7.1) and female (Table 7.2) populations have changed between 1980 
and 2000 for all adults in my sample and for adults in the bottom quarter 
of the earnings potential distribution. Each table presents the proportion 
of the population accounted for by four mutually exclusive racial or 
ethnic groups (non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, non-Hispanic 
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Asian, and Hispanic), the distribution of a given group’s share by level 
of educational attainment, and the proportion who are immigrant, insti-
tutionalized, or who report a work-limiting disability. 
The prime-age adult male population has become less white, more 
Hispanic, and more Asian. The fraction of all men that are black has 
increased slightly. Within racial groups, the distribution of educational 
attainment has shifted decisively towards higher levels for whites and 
Table 7.1  Comparison of All Out-of-School Men 18 to 55 with Similar 



























































































































SOURCE: Author’s tabulations from the 1980 and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples 
(PUMS) of the U.S. Census of Housing and Population.
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blacks. Across groups, Hispanics constitute an increasing proportion 
of those with the lowest level of educational attainment. In addition to 
these changes, the proportion of immigrants among the male population 
has more than doubled, the proportion with a work-limiting disabil-
ity has increased by over 60 percent, and the proportion in institutions 
has increased by over 200 percent. The change in the proportion that 
is institutionalized refl ects the net effect of two offsetting trends: the 
Table 7.2  Comparison of All Out-of-School Women 18 to 55 with Similar 



























































































































SOURCE: Author’s tabulations from the 1980 and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples 
(PUMS) of the U.S. Census of Housing and Population.
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proportion of the male population in mental hospitals has declined con-
tinuously since 1980, while the proportion in local jails and state and 
federal prisons has greatly increased (Raphael and Stoll 2007).
For men in the bottom quarter of the earnings distribution there are 
some notable facts. In both 1980 and 2000, racial and ethnic minorities 
are considerably overrepresented among low earners while white males 
are underrepresented. Changes between 1980 and 2000 have reinforced 
this pattern: there has been a decline in the proportion that is white of 
0.12, an increase in the proportion that is black of 0.015, an increase in 
the proportion that is Asian of 0.016, and an increase in the proportion 
that is Hispanic of 0.081. Low earners are considerably more educated 
on average in 2000 than they were in 1980. Roughly 49 percent of low-
earning males in 1980 had less than a complete high school education, 
compared to 33 percent in 2000. Conversely, the proportion with a high 
school diploma increased from 33 to 41 percent. In contrast to the over-
all trend, the proportion of low-earning workers with a work-limiting 
disability declined from 0.35 to 0.25.
One of the most dramatic differences between the trends for low-
income men and the trends for all men concerns the large absolute in-
crease in institutionalization rates. In 2000, nearly one quarter of men 
whose earnings potential fell in the bottom quarter of the earnings dis-
tribution were institutionalized, and most of these men were in state 
or federal prisons or jail. This represents a nearly 10-percentage-point 
increase since 1980.
For women, Table 7.2 reveals that the overall distributions of the 
adult female population across racial or ethnic groups and levels of 
educational attainment are comparable to those of men (as shown in 
Table 7.1) in both years. For low-wage women, however, white wom-
en account for much larger proportions of the low-wage population in 
both years as compared to men. The proportion of immigrants and the 
proportion of disabled increase for women overall. Among low-wage 
women, the proportion that is immigrant more than doubles while the 
proportion with work-limiting disabilities increases slightly. The most 
notable difference relative to men concerns institutionalization trends. 
There is a very slight increase from a very low level in 1980 in the over-
all proportion of women in institutions (from 0.004 to 0.005). Among 
low-earnings women, the increase is larger (from 0.010 to 0.018), yet 
much smaller than that observed for men.
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Trends in Wages, Employment, and Institutionalization for 
Disaggregated Subgroups
Table 7.3 presents the average log wages for men and women for 
1980, 1990, and 2000 by race or ethnicity and by level of educational 
attainment; it also shows the change for each decade. Note that since 
wages are expressed in logs, the change between any two years is ap-
proximately equal to the proportional change in hourly earnings. For 
the entire period, potential wages decline for all men who do not have a 
college degree or more, and the largest declines occur for men with less 
than a complete high school education. Among the least educated white 
men, wages decline by roughly 22 percent between 1980 and 2000, with 
most of the decline occurring during the 1980s. For black and Hispanic 
high school dropouts, hourly wages decline overall by 17 percent, again 
with most of the wage loss occurring in the earlier decade. There are 
also sizable declines in the hourly wages of male high school graduates. 
These patterns clearly reveal the growing returns to education among 
men and are consistent with the fi ndings of previous research.4
Wage trends for women are quite different from those for men. Per-
haps the most notable differences pertain to wage levels for a given group 
and at a given point in time. There are large intergender disparities favor-
ing males in each year within each race or ethnicity education group. 
However, these within-group disparities decline between 1980 and 2000.
The declines in hourly wages for women with the least skills are 
considerably more modest than the comparable declines experienced 
by men. For example, the hourly wages of white women with less than 
a high school diploma declined by 10 percent between 1980 and 1990 
and then increased by 3 percent over the subsequent decade. The com-
parable changes for similarly educated white men are declines of 18 
percent between 1980 and 1990 and 4 percent thereafter. Similarly, 
the hourly wages of white female high school graduates increased by 
roughly 2 percent between 1980 and 2000 while the wages of corre-
sponding white men declined by 14 percent.
Prior research on the labor supply responses of men and women 
suggests that declines in hourly wages should result in a decline in em-
ployment among those experiencing the wage change. A decrease in 
wages reduces the rate at which an individual can convert his nonmar-
ket time into money by supplying his time to the formal labor market. 
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To the extent that people value their time, a decline in the wages that 
one’s labor will command is likely to induce one to either supply less 
time or withdraw from the labor force entirely.5 Thus, in conjunction 
with the patterns in Table 7.3, this simple theory predicts that employ-
ment rates should have declined considerably for low-skilled men and 
less so for low-skilled women.
Indeed, employment does tend to decline for those demographic 
groups experiencing the largest declines in earnings. Table 7.4 presents 
the proportion of each group employed at the time of the census inter-
view for the same race/ethnicity-education-gender groups displayed in 
Table 7.3. There are sizable declines in the employment rates of the 
least skilled male workers. Between 1980 and 2000, the employment 
rate for white high school dropouts declined by 14 percentage points, 
while employment for white high school graduates fell roughly 7 per-
centage points. For black men, there are large declines in employment 
for all groups with the exception of college-educated black men, and 
there is an especially large decline (27 percentage points) for black high 
school dropouts. By 2000, only one-third of prime-age, black male high 
school dropouts were employed on a given day, compared to nearly 
two-thirds in 1980.
For the least skilled men the declines in employment rates during 
the 1990s are of equal magnitude to, or larger than, the declines ob-
served during the 1980s. By contrast, nearly all of the wage losses for 
these groups occur during the 1980s, suggesting that factors beyond 
declining wages are also driving the poor employment outcomes of 
less-skilled men.
Low-earning women experienced smaller wage losses than men 
from comparable demographic groups and with similar levels of edu-
cational attainment, and thus one would expect a priori that declines in 
employment would be more modest for women. In fact, with the excep-
tion of black and Asian women having less than a high school degree, 
the employment rates of all groups increased during the 1980s. Juhn 
and Potter (2006) demonstrate that this increase in labor force participa-
tion represents the tail end of a long trend towards greater participation 
among women of all skill levels. Between 1990 and 2000, this trend 
appears to have slowed, with modest to moderate declines in employ-
ment among women from all racial or ethnic groups and all levels of 
educational attainment.
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Table 7.3  Average Log Wages for Men and Women 18 to 55 Years of Age by Race/Ethnicity, Educational 
Attainment, and Year
Panel A: Men
1980 1990 2000 1980–1990 1990–2000
White
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
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Panel B: Women
1980 1990 2000 1980–1990 1990–2000
White



































































































SOURCE: Author’s tabulations from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the U.S. Census of Housing 
and Population.
tb08fogjch7.indd   255
tb08fogjch7.indd   255
9/10/2008   12:50:36 PM
9/10/2008   12:50:36 PM
256  
Table 7.4  Proportion Employed for Men and Women 18 to 55 Years of Age by Race/Ethnicity, Educational 
Attainment, and Year
Panel A: Men
1980 1990 2000 1980–1990 1990–2000
White men
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
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Panel B: Women
1980 1990 2000 1980–1990 1990–2000
White



































































































SOURCE: Author’s tabulations from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the U.S. Census of Housing 
and Population.
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One interesting pattern evident in Table 7.4 concerns the within-
group gender disparities in employment rates. In 1980 and 1990, men 
are more likely to be employed than comparable women in every group 
displayed in the table, with the sole exception of black college graduates 
in 1990. While this gender disparity varies considerably across groups, 
differentials on the order of 10 to 15 percentage points are typical. In the 
year 2000, comparable gender differences are observed among whites, 
Asians, and Hispanics. For blacks, however, the employment rates of 
males have deteriorated far enough to render the male-female employ-
ment rate differentials negative for most educational groups.
Finally, Table 7.5 presents the proportion institutionalized at the 
time of the census survey. The proportion institutionalized is composed 
disproportionately of inmates of local jails and state and federal prisons. 
The table reveals stark intergender, interracial, and cross-educational 
group disparities in the incidence of incarceration and the change in 
this incidence over this two-decade period. The largest increases are 
observed for black males with less than a high school degree. Between 
1980 and 2000, the proportion institutionalized increased from roughly 
8 percent to 27 percent of this population, a number similar in magni-
tude to the 33 percent of this group that is employed. The incarcera-
tion rate for men without a high school diploma more than doubled 
for whites and Asians, and nearly doubled for Hispanics, although the 
levels are considerably lower than those observed for blacks. The in-
carceration rates for women are quite low, although the rate for black 
women tripled—from 0.01 to 0.03—between 1980 and 2000.
The proportion of men who have ever served time in prison is cer-
tainly larger than the proportion incarcerated at any given point in time. 
The U.S. prison population is characterized by a high rate of turnover: 
nearly one-half of the population is released each year, and slightly over 
half is admitted (Raphael and Stoll 2007). The Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics estimates that a black male born in 2001 has a 33 percent chance of 
serving prison time at some point in his life. The BJS also estimates that 
roughly 20 percent of all adult black males and 3 to 4 percent of white 
males have served time at some point in their lives (Bonczar 2003). In 
previous research on the California state prison system, I estimated the 
proportion of adults males by race, age, and education who had served 
time in the state prison system. Roughly one-third of prime-age (25 to 
44) white men with less than a high school education had been through 
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the state prison system. For black men with less than a high school edu-
cation, a prior prison spell was nearly certain (Raphael 2006).
These trends indicate that to a greater extent than ever before, low-
skilled men who are not institutionalized are likely to have felony con-
victions and prison experience in their past. Combined with relatively 
easy access to criminal records and employers actively screening for 
this factor, this trend indicates that this particular development has be-
come an increasingly important handicap for low-skilled men in the 
legitimate labor market. 
TO WHAT EXTENT DO CHANGES IN WAGES EXPLAIN 
RECENT EMPLOYMENT AND INCARCERATION TRENDS?
Thus, relatively less-educated men and women have both expe-
rienced declines in earnings since 1980, but men have experienced 
the most severe declines. These wage patterns correspond to uniform 
decreases in the employment rates of the least educated men, includ-
ing particularly large declines for black men, and mixed patterns with 
regard to the changes in employment for the least educated women. 
Concurrently, the proportion of males incarcerated and not working has 
increased—by a great amount for certain subgroups (black men in par-
ticular), and by a more moderate yet signifi cant amount for less-skilled 
men more generally.
Certainly, these changes in earnings, employment, and institution-
alization rates are related, and the causality runs in multiple directions. 
Declining wages are likely to induce some to withdraw from the labor 
force. Moreover, decreases in the returns to legitimate work increase 
the relative returns to criminal activity, a factor that will increase the 
proportion of the population at risk of becoming incarcerated and, ul-
timately, the incarceration rate. Finally, men fail to accumulate human 
capital while incarcerated (Raphael 2006), may be stigmatized by the 
label of ex-offender when seeking legitimate employment (Holzer, Ra-
phael, and Stoll 2006, 2007; Pager 2003), and may experience an ero-
sion of their legitimate work skills and an augmentation of their propen-
sity to engage in crime while incarcerated. These factors are all likely to 
negatively infl uence employment and earnings.
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Table 7.5  Proportion Institutionalized for Men and Women 18 to 55 Years of Age by Race/Ethnicity, Educational 
Attainment, and Year
Panel A: Men
1980 1990 2000 1980–1990 1990–2000
White
   Less than high school
   High school graduate
   Some college
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Panel B: Women
1980 1990 2000 1980–1990 1990–2000
White
   Less than high school
   High school graduate
   Some college
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SOURCE: Author’s tabulations from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the U.S. Census of Housing 
and Population.
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The fi rst two factors suggest that diminished wages are likely to be 
partially responsible for the low employment rates of low-skilled men 
and perhaps for their newly high incarceration rates. Put simply, if peo-
ple at the bottom of the earnings distribution are not working because 
working pays less than it used to, and are engaging in more criminal 
activity as a side product, then addressing this problem requires mak-
ing legitimate work pay. Tables 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5 do indeed suggest that 
those groups suffering the largest wage losses also exhibit the largest 
employment declines and the largest increases in incarceration, although 
the patterns across groups and the timing aren’t perfect. Hence, to the 
extent that society could alter existing taxes and subsidies to improve 
the take-home pay of low-earning workers, policymakers may be able 
to turn the tide on some of these more adverse developments.
In this section, I address two related questions that will provide the 
analytical research fi ndings to more thoroughly investigate this policy 
idea. Specifi cally, to what extent are recent employment trends driven 
by falling wages? Concurrently, how much of the increase in institution-
alization rates can be attributed to poorer labor market opportunities?
Declining Wages and the Employment Rates of Low-Skilled Men 
and Women
To assess the extent to which declining wages drive declining em-
ployment rates, one needs to assess the degree to which labor supply 
behavior is responsive to changes in potential earnings. The theoretical 
concept used by economists to describe this behavioral response is the 
labor supply elasticity. The supply elasticity is defi ned as the percentage 
change in employment among a given group caused by a 1-percentage-
point change in wages.
In Appendix 7A, I describe the details of a procedure that I use to 
estimate the labor supply responsiveness of men and women to changes 
in wages. While I do not discuss the details here, I will note that the 
estimation method accounts for the institutionalized and the possibility 
that the labor supply decision may ultimately affect the probability of 
an incarceration spell. The elasticity estimates from this analysis are 
presented in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. The estimates from a model that uses 
all men indicates a moderate degree of responsiveness of employment 
to wages, with a high-end labor supply elasticity estimate of roughly 0.2 
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(indicating that a 10 percent decrease in wages would cause a 2 percent 
decrease in employment). Race-specifi c estimates suggest that black 
men are most responsive to changes in wages.
In general, women’s supply behavior is more responsive to wage 
changes than that of men. The low-end overall elasticity estimate for 
women is nearly double the high-end estimate for men (0.4 vs. 0.2). 
In addition, the elasticity estimates for black and Hispanic women are 
particularly large. This range of elasticity estimates for both men and 
women is in line with the results discussed in Devereux (2003), Juhn 
(1992), Juhn and Potter (2006), and Pencavel (1997, 2002).
Using these elasticity estimates and the wage changes documented 
in Table 7.3, it is possible to calculate the degree to which declining 
wages explain recent employment patterns.6 I present the results from 
these calculations in Table 7.6. The fi rst column presents actual changes 
Figure 7.1  Labor Supply Elasticity Estimates For Men, Based on Census 
Microdata by Race or Ethnicity
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on the regression model estimates from the 
1980, 1990, and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the U.S. Census of 
Housing and Population.
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in employment rates between 1980 and 2000 for the race and education 
groups depicted in Tables 7.3 through 7.5. The second column pres-
ents the change in employment predicted by the actual change in wages 
for this group using the high race-specifi c elasticity estimate from the 
values presented in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. The fi nal column presents a 
similar calculation using the low elasticity estimate for the given race 
and gender group.
For the least educated men, declining earnings explains relatively 
small, but not unsubstantial, portions of the decline in employment rates. 
For white men without a high school degree, the predicted changes in 
employment attributable to declining wages range from no change to 
a decline of 3 percentage points. For black men without a high school 
degree, 4 to 6 percentage points of the 27-percentage-point decline can 
be attributed to a negative supply response to falling wages, constitut-
Figure 7.2  Labor Supply Elasticity Estimates For Women, Based on 
Census Microdata by Race or Ethnicity
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on regression model estimates from the 1980, 
1990, and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the U.S. Census of Hous-
ing and Population.
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ing 16 to 22 percent of the decline. Similarly, for black men with high 
school diplomas (the modal category for this group of men), declining 
wages explain 3 to 5 percentage points of the 16-percentage-point de-
cline between 1980 and 2000 (roughly 18 to 30 percent of the decline). 
Thus, reversing wage trends for low-skilled men would likely lead to 
increases in employment rates, but the increases would fall far short of 
undoing the employment declines witnessed in recent decades.
Among women, only black and Hispanic women experienced sub-
stantial declines in employment between 1980 and 2000, and even for 
these groups, the declines are modest in comparison to those for men. 
For black women with less than a high school degree, roughly 16 per-
cent of the decline in employment is attributable to declining wages. 
For comparable Hispanic women, however, half to all of declining em-
ployment can be attributed to lower wages in 2000.
To be sure, the relative returns to work for the less skilled have been 
infl uenced by various policy developments over this time period that are 
not refl ected in their hourly wages. For poor women with children, wel-
fare reform, the expansion of the EITC, Medicaid expansions, and the 
introduction of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) 
have greatly increased the returns to work. In fact, with the EITC af-
fecting take-home pay by as much as 40 percent for some workers, the 
hourly wage provides a rather imprecise measure of the marginal return 
to an additional hour of work for the least skilled women. 
The wages of childless men as well as those of men who are non-
custodial fathers have not been infl uenced by these developments. In 
fact, for many of these men, the marginal return to working has likely 
been eroded by child support policies that garnish the wages of men 
with arrearages and impose large marginal taxes on legitimate labor 
market earnings, while (in cases where their former partners and chil-
dren are receiving public assistance) passing little to none of the col-
lected revenues on to their dependents (Edelman, Holzer, and Offner 
2006; Primus 2006). Thus, for low-skilled men as well, observable 
hourly wages provide a noisy and perhaps biased gauge of the after-tax 
rewards from work. 
Nonetheless, these tabulations do indicate that the phenomenon of 
falling wages provides a partial explanation for the eroding employ-
ment rates of the least skilled, especially for less-educated African 
Americans.
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Table 7.6  Comparison of Actual Changes in Employment Rates to Changes Predicted by Labor Supply Elasticity 
Estimates
Panel A: Men
Actual change in employment 
rates, 1980–2000
Predicted change, largest 
elasticity estimates
Predicted change, smallest 
elasticity estimates
White
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
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Panel B: Women
Actual change in employment 
rates, 1980–2000
Predicted change, largest 
elasticity estimates
Predicted change, smallest 
elasticity estimates
White
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
































































SOURCE: Author’s analysis of data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the U.S. Census of Popula-
tion and Housing.
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Declining Wages and the Increased Incarceration Rates of Men
There is now considerable evidence that economically motivated 
crime increases with unemployment and decreases as average wages 
rise, especially the average wages of low-skilled workers (Fagan and 
Freeman 1999; Freeman 1987; Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard 2002; 
Grogger 1998; and Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001). A higher average 
propensity to commit crimes will result in a larger prison population 
(Raphael and Stoll 2007). These two effects jointly describe the path-
way between the eroding labor market position of low-skilled adults 
and the increase in incarceration. Simply stated, when work pays less, 
more people shun work and turn to crime. The more people that com-
mit crimes, the higher the proportion at risk for incarceration and the 
greater the incarceration rate.
In Appendix 7B, I outline a strategy for estimating the effect of 
the decline in wages described in Table 7.3 on the increase in incar-
ceration rates discussed above. The method requires drawing on exist-
ing estimates of the responsiveness of criminal activity to changes in 
wages, estimating the risk of incarceration conditional on engaging in 
crime, and estimating the time one is likely to serve conditional on be-
ing caught and incarcerated. The results of this exercise are presented in 
Table 7.7. The table presents estimates for men only, since the changes 
in institutionalization rates are quite modest for women. The fi rst col-
umn of fi gures presents the actual change in the proportion institution-
alized, the next column presents the change predicted by wage changes 
between 1980 and 2000, and the fi nal column presents the ratio of the 
predicted to the actual change. For relatively less-educated white men, 
declining wages predict an increase in the institutionalization rate equal 
to approximately 15 percent of the actual increase. By comparison, the 
proportion of the actual increase for low-educated black men predicted 
by their change in wages is quite small (on the order of 2 to 3 percent). 
This is driven largely by the much larger increases in institutionaliza-
tion rates for black men. The fi gures for Asian and Hispanic men are 
more in line with those for whites. For Hispanic high school dropouts, 
declining wages predict roughly 18 percent of the increase in incarcera-
tion rates. 
These results suggest that declining earnings explain a small por-
tion of the overall increase in incarceration. In previous research with 
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Michael Stoll (Raphael and Stoll 2007), I have estimated that declining 
wages for low-skilled men are responsible for no more than 13 percent 
of the increase in incarceration rates between 1980 and 2000. Nonethe-
less, small decreases in incarceration caused by, for example, a wage 
subsidy may generate substantial social savings. Correction expen-
ditures per prison year are on the order of $35,000 a year (Donohue 
2007). In 2005, there were approximately 1.5 million prison inmates. If 
a targeted wage subsidy were to reduce the prison population by a mod-
Table 7.7  Comparison of Actual Changes in Institutionalization Rates 
for Men and Predicted Changes Based on Changes in Hourly 
Wages
Actual change in 
institutionalization 
rates, 1980–2000







Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
































































NOTE: See text for discussion of predicted changes in institutionalization rates. The 
predictions make use of the absolute changes in log hourly wages between 1980 and 
2000, presented in Table 7.3.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations based on data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Public 
Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the U.S. Census of Population and Housing.
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est 5 percent, 75,000 fewer inmates would be incarcerated on any given 
day, generating savings in corrections expenditures of roughly $2.6 bil-
lion. Moreover, this fi gure would increase considerably if we were to 
account for some of the harder-to-price social costs of incarceration 
(including the impact on families and public health) as well as the value 
in stolen goods or losses from the crimes averted. Thus, even small ef-
fects such as those in Table 7.7 deserve serious consideration.
CRIMINAL RECORDS AND THE EMPLOYMENT 
PROSPECTS OF LOW-EARNING MALES
To be sure, the relatively poor labor market outcomes for very low-
skilled men and women are driven largely by skill defi cits and a general 
lack of job readiness. This is true of low earners in years past as well 
as the present and of workers at the bottom of the earnings distribu-
tion in other market economies as well as ours. Nonetheless, the recent 
U.S. experience is one where earnings and employment have eroded 
while the formal level of educational attainment among the least skilled 
has actually increased. These incongruous trends suggest that factors 
beyond skills have operated to chip away at the relative and absolute 
economic position of these adults.
In this section, I discuss the likely impacts of the large increases 
in the proportion of low-skilled men with criminal records on their 
employment and earnings prospects. We have already seen that male 
incarceration rates have increased considerably, as has the proportion 
of men with prison time in their past. Here, I explore the mechanisms 
through which a prior incarceration experience is likely to affect earn-
ings and employment not only in the immediate future but throughout 
one’s lifetime.
Incarceration and the Accumulation of Work Experience
Serving time interrupts one’s work career. The extent of this inter-
ruption depends on both the expected amount of time served on a typi-
cal term as well as the likelihood of serving subsequent prison terms. 
The average prisoner admitted during the late 1990s on a new commit-
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ment faced a maximum sentence of three years and a minimum of one 
year—with many serving time closer to the minimum (Raphael and 
Stoll 2004). If this were the only time served for most, then the time 
interruption of prison would not be that substantial.7 
However, many people serve multiple terms in prison, either be-
cause of the commission of new felonies or because of violation of 
parole conditions after their release. A large body of criminological 
research consistently fi nds that nearly two-thirds of ex-inmates are re-
arrested within a few years of release from prison (Petersilia 2003). 
Moreover, a sizable majority of the re-arrested will serve subsequent 
prison terms. Thus, for many offenders, the typical experience between 
the ages of 18 and 30 is characterized by multiple short prison spells 
with intermittent, and relatively brief, spells outside of prison.
In previous longitudinal research on young offenders entering the 
California state prison system, I documented the degree to which prison 
interrupts the early potential work careers of young men. I followed 
a cohort of young men entering the state prison system in 1990 and 
gauged the amount of time served over the subsequent decade (Raphael 
2006). This analysis is summarized in Table 7.8. Panel A presents esti-
mates of the distribution of the total amount of time served, comprising 
multiple prison terms. The median inmate serves 2.79 years during the 
1990s, with the median white inmate (3.09 years) and median black 
inmate (3.53 years) serving more time and the median Hispanic inmate 
(2.23 years) serving less time.8 Roughly 25 percent of inmates served 
at least fi ve years during the 1990s while another 25 percent served less 
than 1.5 years.
However, as a gauge of the extent of the temporal interruption, 
these fi gures are misleading. Cumulative time served does not account 
for the short periods of time between prison spells where inmates may 
fi nd employment yet are not able to solidify the employment match 
with any measurable amount of job tenure. A more appropriate measure 
of the degree to which incarceration impedes experience accumulation 
would be the time between the date of admission to prison for the fi rst 
term served and the date of release from the last term. 
Panel B of Table 7.8 presents the quartile values from the distribu-
tion of this variable. For the median inmate, fi ve years elapses between 
the fi rst date of admission and the last date of release. For median white, 
black, and Hispanic inmates, the comparable fi gures are 6.2, 6.4, and 
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3.7 years, respectively. For approximately one-quarter of inmates, near-
ly nine years pass between their initial commission to prison and their 
last release. In other words, one-quarter of these inmates spent almost 
the entire decade cycling in and out of prison.
Spending fi ve years of one’s early life (6.4 years for the median black 
offender) cycling in and out of institutions must impact one’s earnings 
prospects. Clearly, being behind bars and having only short spans of time 
outside of prison prohibit the accumulation of job experiences during a 
period of one’s life when the returns to experience are the greatest.
Does Having Been in Prison Stigmatize Ex-Offenders?
The potential impact of serving time on future labor market pros-
pects extends beyond the failure to accumulate work experience. Em-
Table 7.8  Quartile Values of the Total Time Served during the 1990s 
and the Time between the Date of First Admission and Date 
of Last Release for the 1990 Prison Cohort Between 18 and 25 
Years of Age
Panel A: Distribution of Total Time Served
25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile
All Inmates 1.44 2.79 4.81
White 1.43 3.09 5.12
Black 1.93 3.53 5.45
Hispanic 1.29 2.23 3.97
Panel B: Distribution of Time between the Date of First Admission and the 
Date of Last Release
25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile
All Inmates 1.86 4.99 8.71
White 2.01 6.17 9.11
Black 2.88 6.42 9.16
Hispanic 1.44 3.65 7.62
NOTE: Tabulations are based on all individuals between the ages of 18 and 25 that 
entered the California state prison system during 1990 serving the fi rst term of a com-
mitment.  Tabulation of the percentiles of the two time distributions are based on all 
terms served over the subsequent 10 years.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations of administrative records provided by the California 
Department of Corrections.  
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ployers are averse to hiring former prison inmates and often use formal 
and informal screening tools to weed ex-offenders out of the applicant 
pool. Given the high proportion of low-skilled men with prison time on 
their criminal records, such employer sentiments and screening practic-
es represent an increasingly important employment barrier, especially 
for low-skilled African American men.
Employers consider criminal records when screening job applicants 
for a number of reasons. For starters, certain occupations are closed 
to felons under local, state, and in some instances federal law (Hahn 
1991). In many states employers can be held liable for the criminal 
actions of their employees. Under the theory of negligent hiring, em-
ployers can be required to pay punitive damages as well as damages for 
loss, pain, and suffering for acts committed by an employee on the job 
(Craig 1987). Finally, employers looking to fi ll jobs where employee 
monitoring is imperfect may place a premium on trustworthiness and 
screen accordingly.
In all known employer surveys where employers are asked about 
their willingness to hire ex-offenders, employer responses reveal a 
strong aversion to hiring applicants with criminal records (Holzer, Ra-
phael, and Stoll 2006, 2007; Pager 2003). For example, over 60 per-
cent of employers surveyed in the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality 
(MCSUI) indicated that they would “probably not” or “defi nitely not” 
hire applicants with criminal histories, with “probably not” being the 
modal response. By way of contrast, only 8 percent responded similarly 
when queried about their willingness to hire current and former welfare 
recipients.
The ability of employers to act on an aversion to ex-offenders, and 
the nature of the action they take in terms of hiring and screening be-
havior, will depend on their access to applicants’ criminal histories. If 
an employer can and does access criminal records, the employer may 
simply screen out applicants based on their actual arrest and conviction 
records. In the absence of a formal background check, an employer may 
act on an aversion to hiring ex-offenders using perceived correlates of 
previous incarceration, such as age, race, and level of educational at-
tainment, to attempt to screen out those with criminal histories. In other 
words, employers may statistically profi le applicants and avoid hiring 
those from demographic groups with high rates of involvement in the 
criminal justice system (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2006).
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The audit study by Pager (2003) offers perhaps the clearest evi-
dence of employer aversion to hiring ex-offenders and the stigma as-
sociated with having served time in prison. The study uses male audi-
tors matched on observable characteristics—including age, education, 
general appearance, demeanor, and race—to assess the effects of prior 
prison experience on the likelihood that each auditor is called back for 
an interview. The author fi nds consistently sizable negative effects of 
prior prison experience on the likelihood of being called back by the 
employer, with callback rates for the auditor with prior prison time one-
half that of the matched coauditor.
Summary
Incarceration is likely to negatively affect the earnings and employ-
ment prospects of former inmates. On the supply side, incarcerated fel-
ons fail to accumulate work experience during a period of life when 
earnings tend to increase the fastest. The time out of the labor force 
while incarcerated, as well as the longer time of tenuous attachment to 
the labor force while cycling in and out of prison, permanently alters the 
lifetime earnings path of former inmates for the worse. On the demand 
side, employers consistently express a strong reluctance to hire workers 
with criminal records. This reluctance is driven in part by liability fears 
and by a premium placed on trustworthiness, but also by public policy 
that legally prohibits employers from hiring convicted felons in certain 
job categories. In sum, the greater incidence of involvement with the 
criminal justice system that has occurred over the past three decades 
has most certainly negatively affected the prospects of the least-skilled 
U.S. adults.
IMPROVING THE PROSPECTS OF LOW-SKILLED ADULTS: 
EXPANDING THE EITC AND REMOVING EMPLOYMENT 
BARRIERS FOR FORMER INMATES
I have documented a severe erosion of the earnings and employ-
ment of less-skilled men in the United States and less detrimental de-
velopments for less-skilled women. While the sources of these trends 
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are certainly complex, there are direct policy levers under the control 
of federal and state government that could be effectively employed to 
reverse them. From among these, raising the minimum wage would 
most directly increase the earnings of the lowest-paid workers. While 
economists debate the likely employment effects of raising the mini-
mum wage, there is solid research suggesting that modest increases 
have very little effect on employment while increasing the total amount 
of income earned by the least skilled (Card and Krueger 1994).9 More-
over, the earnings of the least skilled are low primarily because of their 
low skills. Improving our primary, secondary, and postsecondary edu-
cational systems as well as augmenting the resources devoted to work-
force development would clearly benefi t our lowest earners (the topic 
of discussion in the chapter in this volume by Lerman).
In this section, I offer and analyze two proposals for improving the 
take-home earnings of the least skilled workers and for boosting the 
employment rates of those who should be working yet are participating 
in the formal labor force at historically low levels. First, I discuss sev-
eral current proposals for expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit to 
single childless workers and offer a hybrid proposal that combines what 
I see as the best elements of each. Second, I discuss several steps that 
federal, state, and local policymakers could take to improve the chances 
of former inmates and convicted felons and aid the reentry of recently 
released inmates into conventional society.
Expanding the EITC
First introduced in the 1970s, the EITC has become one of the most 
important antipoverty policies in the United States. At a current cost of 
approximately $40 billion, the EITC distributes income to low-earning 
workers primarily in families with children, although there is a modest 
benefi t for childless workers between 25 and 65 years of age. EITC 
benefi ts are calculated as a fraction of annual earnings up to a maximum 
and are phased out at a gradual rate for income earned beyond a fur-
ther threshold. For example, for a married couple with two children in 
2007, the EITC provides an additional $0.40 for each dollar earned up 
to $11,790, totaling a maximum annual benefi t of $4,716. The benefi t 
level is held constant until family earnings reach $17,390 and then is 
reduced by $0.21 for each dollar earned above this threshold until the 
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benefi t is completely phased out (which occurs at $39,783). Since ben-
efi ts are conditional on having positive earnings, the EITC provides a 
strong incentive to participate in the labor force, although the program 
does provide an incentive for many workers who are already working 
to work fewer hours a year.10
The expansions of the EITC during the 1990s had very large im-
pacts on the employment and after-tax incomes of those adults most 
affected (Meyer and Holtz-Eakin 2001; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001). 
However, these expansions had little impact on the earnings of single 
noncustodial parents or childless single adults with very low earnings, 
as nearly all of the extra resources devoted to the program went to 
households with children. In light of this fact, there are several recent 
proposals to expand the EITC for childless adults and noncustodial par-
ents (Berlin 2007; Center for American Progress 2007; Danziger and 
Gottschalk 2005; Edelman, Holzer, and Offner 2006). 
The attractiveness of such proposals lies both in their simplicity 
and in their direct effect on the earnings of the least skilled. Rising 
earnings inequality and declining wages, driven by a host of factors, 
have adversely affected the material well-being and employment rates 
of the least skilled workers. Thus, making work pay through a wage 
subsidy will directly counter these trends regardless of their source, and 
improve the material well-being of the poor, while providing them with 
a strong incentive to engage in the legitimate labor market and perhaps 
a disincentive to engage in criminal activity. To be sure, the existing 
proposals vary in three ways: 1) cost, 2) the degree to which the ben-
efi ts are targeted towards the lowest earners, and 3) the degree to which 
these expansions affect incentives in other respects, such as marriage. 
Moreover, along these three dimensions no one proposal dominates.
Here, I analyze several variants of two recent proposals to expand 
the EITC, and I fashion a simple hybrid of the two proposals that ad-
dresses the marriage penalty while maintaining the well-targeted na-
ture of the current EITC. The two existing plans that I analyze are as 
follows:
The Edelman, Holzer, and Offner (EHO) Proposal. In their 
book, Reconnecting Disadvantaged Young Men, Peter Edelman, Harry 
Holzer, and Paul Offner (2006) offer a plan for a targeted expansion 
of the EITC toward single childless workers and noncustodial parents. 
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The plan calls for a 20 percent wage subsidy for the fi rst $7,500 in 
earnings, yielding a maximum subsidy of $1,500. Beyond earnings of 
$10,000, the subsidy is taxed away at the rate of $0.15 per dollar until 
it is completely phased out at $20,000 in annual earnings. The pro-
posal also calls for disregarding one-half of the earnings of the lower-
earning spouse in two-earner families for the purposes of calculating 
EITC benefi ts. In the analysis below, I assume that all workers aged 18 
to 65 who meet the income criteria are eligible for the childless credit. 
Note that this proposal is quite similar to that recently offered by the 
Center for American Progress Task Force on Poverty.11
The Berlin Proposal. In a recent working paper, the president of 
MDRC, Gordon Berlin (2007), proposes a targeted expansion of the 
EITC singles benefi t along with a change in the manner in which fam-
ily income is tabulated for the purposes of the credit. Regarding the 
childless credit, Berlin proposes an expansion for all adults 21 to 54 
years of age who work full time, at a rate of 25 cents per dollar earned 
through $7,800 of earnings, with a phaseout beginning for earnings 
beyond $14,400 at a rate of $0.16 per additional dollar earned (with 
a total phaseout income level of $26,587). Berlin also proposes that 
EITC benefi ts be calculated based on individual income rather than 
family income. Thus, in a two-earner household with two children, the 
higher-earning worker would claim the children for the purposes of the 
EITC, and the benefi t attributable to this worker’s earnings would be 
calculated accordingly. The lower-earning worker would qualify for the 
childless credit.
To highlight the relative characteristics of these two proposals, I 
simulate the costs, impacts on the income distribution, and impacts on 
average earnings of these two plans (and, by extension, the likely im-
pacts on employment). For the sake of simplicity, I modify the existing 
proposals somewhat to highlight the tradeoffs in the two approaches. 
Specifi cally, I apply the EHO childless credit phase-in and phaseout 
rates as well as the income thresholds to the Berlin plan. In addition, I 
assume that all workers between the ages of 21 and 54 are eligible for 
benefi ts under the Berlin plan irrespective of whether they have full-
time or part-time status. I also consider an enhanced EHO plan that ex-
tends the 20 percent earnings subsidy through $10,000 in annual earn-
ings, effectively giving a 20 percent raise to a full-time minimum-wage 
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worker. Finally, I consider a hybrid plan that combines elements of the 
EHO and Berlin proposals. Specifi cally, I combine the EHO childless 
credit for all workers aged 18 to 65 with the Berlin income calculation 
rules applied selectively to families with earnings equal to or less than 
$30,000 a year. For qualifi ed households with earnings above $30,000, 
I apply the income determination rules in the EHO proposal.12
I use the March 2006 Current Population Survey (CPS) to simulate 
how each of these proposals would have affected individuals’ outcomes 
in tax year 2005.13 Table 7.9 displays cost estimates of total EITC dis-
bursements using the parameters of each of these proposals to calculate 
EITC benefi ts for eligible families and individuals. Before proceeding, 
we should note a number of qualifi cations. First, these simulations pre-
dict a total cost for the current system of roughly $30 billion for tax year 
2005, which is approximately $5 to $6 billion below actual costs. In 
isolation, this fact suggests that the costs simulated in the table may be 
biased downward. Biasing the estimates in the other direction, I am as-
suming a 100 percent take-up rate for all available benefi ts. In practice, 
take-up of the EITC is not universal, especially for the childless credit, 
and thus this assumption is likely to bias costs upwards. Finally, the 
cost estimates in Table 7.9 do not account for any behavioral labor sup-
ply response among potential recipients—i.e., the cost estimates simply 
apply the alternative benefi t formulations to those who work, without 
considering the likely impact of expanded employment. However, as I 
will discuss shortly, the employment effects of each of these proposals 
are likely to be quite modest, thus minimizing the importance of this 
particular behavioral effect on costs.
With these caveats in mind, the simulation suggests that the EHO 
plan would increase total EITC costs by roughly $18 billion, the en-
hanced EHO plan would increase them by $35 billion, the Berlin pro-
posal by $26 billion, and the hybrid proposal by $20 billion. For the 
Berlin proposal, my cost estimate is close to that cited by the author in 
the original working paper (approximately $29 billion). For the EHO 
proposal, my cost estimate is nearly double that cited by the authors 
($9.8 billion), although this discrepancy is nearly completely accounted 
for by the difference in the assumed take-up rate.14 Nonetheless, the 
costs estimates reveal a clear ordering, with the EHO proposal the least 
costly, the enhanced EHO proposal the most expensive, and the Berlin 
and hybrid proposals at intermediate cost points. As the enhanced EHO 
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Table 7.9  Simulated Costs of Various Proposals to Expand the Earned Income Tax Credit to Single Childless Adults 
and to Mitigate the Inherent Marriage Penalty
Simulated costs using the 2006 distribution of wage and salary earnings (millions of 2006 dollars)
Benefi ciary category Existing system EHO proposal
Enhanced 
EHO proposal Berlin proposal
Hybrid EHO-
Berlin proposal
Single and childless 1,269 20,062 33,878 13,840 20,062
Married, no children 516 3,166 3,737 7,172 3,788
Married with 
children
13,383 15,203 15,202 25,251 16,571
Single parents 14,315 14,615 14,615 14,615 14,615
Total 29,783 53,046 67,433 60,879 55,037
Difference relative 
to existing
18,165 35,551 25,997 20,156
NOTE: Blank = not applicable. Costs are simulated using data from the March 2006 Current Population Survey. See text for exact descrip-
tion. The EHO-proposed expansion includes a 20 percent credit for single childless adults up to $7,500 in earnings that is phased out 
after $10,000 in earnings at a rate of 0.15. The EHO proposal also includes disregarding half of the earnings of the lower-paid spouse 
in calculating the EITC benefi t for married couples. The enhanced EHO proposal is similar with the exception that the 20 percent credit 
for a single childless adult applies to the fi rst $10,000 in earnings and is phased out after reaching $12,000. The Berlin proposal applies 
the single childless benefi t. The Berlin proposal uses the EHO single childless benefi t formula applied only to single adults between 21 
and 55. The proposal also uses individual income rather than combined income in calculating the EITC credit for married couples. For 
married couples with children, the higher earner’s income is used to calculate the credit with children, while the lower earner receives the 
childless EHO credit. The Hybrid EHO-Berlin proposal is the EHO proposal with one modifi cation: the EITC benefi t for married couples 
with total wage and salary income of less than $30,000 is computed using the individual calculations in the Berlin proposal. The benefi t 
for married couples with higher incomes is computed using the EHO disregard.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations from the March 2006 Current Population Survey.
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proposal would have the largest impact on the take-home pay of low-
income workers, and thus the largest likely effect on employment, the 
cost estimates reveal the fairly obvious tradeoff between impact size 
and cost.
Table 7.10 investigates where in the earnings distribution the ad-
ditional dollars expended under each proposal land. To construct this 
table, I fi rst simulated tax-paying units by assuming that all single 
childless adults as well as single parents fi le individual returns and that 
all married adults fi le joint returns. I then stratifi ed the distribution of 
wage and salary earnings across these tax fi ling units into 10-percent 
slices, or deciles, ordering them from lowest to highest. The fi gures 
in Table 7.10 give the percentage of the additional dollars spent under 
each proposal (i.e., the last row of fi gures in Table 7.9) that would ac-
crue to each income decile.
The table reveals quite large disparities in how well-targeted these 
proposals are towards the bottom of the earnings distribution. The ad-
ditional dollars spent under the EHO and the enhanced EHO propos-
als are heavily concentrated in the bottom three deciles of the earnings 
distribution, with 91 percent of the former and 89 percent of the latter 
accruing to tax-fi ling units that have less than $20,000 in annual in-
come. Some of the additional benefi ts do hit higher up in the income 
distribution, since married couples with incomes as high as $51,000 a 
year would qualify for benefi ts under the EHO proposal.15 However, in 
proportional terms, the amount accruing to units with earnings above 
$40,000 is trivial. For the Berlin proposal, only 49 percent of the ad-
ditional dollars hit the bottom 30 percent of the income distribution, 
with a much higher proportion (38 percent) escaping above the median 
income. These fi gures suggest that there are many households where 
a relatively high-earning spouse is married to a relatively low-earning 
spouse whose income would qualify for the childless benefi t. The hy-
brid proposal, on the other hand, reveals that a targeted application of 
the income eligibility calculations under the Berlin proposal (restricted 
to households with incomes below $30,000) preserves the targeting of 
the EHO proposal with relatively few additional benefi ts accruing to 
high-income households and a relatively modest increase in total costs 
above the base EHO proposal.
While the EHO proposal and its variants are well targeted, the Ber-
lin proposal wins out in terms of the implicit marriage penalty. Table 
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Table 7.10  Distribution of Additional Dollars Spent Above the Existing Credit by the Deciles of the Wage and 
Salary Earnings of Simulated Tax-Filing Units
% additional dollars going to each earnings decile under the following proposals
Deciles of the 
earnings distribution EHO proposal
Enhanced 
EHO proposal Berlin proposal
Hybrid EHO- 
Berlin proposal
D1:     <6,000 21 13 9 19
D2:       6,001–13,000 49 41 26 45
D3:     13,001–20,000 21 35 14 20
D4:     20,001–25,743 1 6 4 4
D5:     25,744–34,000 3 2 9 7
D6:     34,001–42,500 3 2 11 3
D7:     42,501–55,000 1 0 13 1
D8:     55,001–73,500 0 0 7 0
D9:     73,501–102,000 0 0 4 0
D10: 102,001 and up 0 0 3 0
NOTE: The fi gures in the table give the percentage of the additional dollars spent above the current system that would accrue to tax fi ling 
units of the given income class. The nature of the proposals is discussed in the notes to Table 7.9 and in the text.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations from March 2006 Current Population Survey.
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7.11 calculates the credit for a two-earner family in which each working 
adult earns $10,000 per year (roughly the earnings of a full-time mini-
mum wage worker). Hypothetical credits are tabulated for married, for 
unmarried, and by the number of dependent children. While the actual 
fi nancial effect of marriage will differ in magnitude and, sometimes, in 
sign from those presented in Table 7.11 for households with different 
income mixes, two full-time low-paid workers provide a good baseline 
for policy intended to reduce poverty and aid the lowest paid workers 
in the country. In general, the marriage disincentives will be higher for 
higher-income couples in most of the proposals analyzed here.
As can be seen, the current EITC, when considered in isolation, cre-
ates modest disincentives to marry. The largest penalty occurs for cou-
ples with one child ($683). The EHO proposal as well as the enhanced 
EHO proposal tend to exacerbate this problem. For a couple with no 
children, marriage reduces total credit income by roughly $1,950. The 
effect is somewhat smaller for couples with one child (−$1,500) and 
two or more children (−$964). These penalties are considerably larger 
for the enhanced EHO proposal.
In contrast, there is no marriage penalty under the Berlin proposal. 
Since benefi ts are calculated according to individual rather than joint 
income, the proposal has a neutral impact on household formation. 
This is clearly an attractive design feature. However, it comes at the 
expense of poorer targeting of the benefi t dollars, as was illustrated in 
Table 7.10. The hybrid proposal also eliminates the marriage penalty 
for this low-income couple. However, the penalty is shifted further up 
the income distribution, specifi cally towards couples with combined 
incomes of $30,000 or higher. Aggregate benefi ts for such higher-
income couples are smaller than for lower-income couples and account 
for a smaller percentage of annual income. Thus one might argue that in 
such instances the marriage penalty associated with the EITC is likely 
to have less of an infl uence on behavior than when the credit is larger, 
both absolutely and proportionally.
In our discussion of employment and earnings trends, the role of 
declining wages in explaining the declining employment of low-skilled 
men and women was heavily emphasized. One might ask whether the 
proposed expansions analyzed here would appreciably alter employ-
ment by greatly increasing the returns to formal work. Among the low-
est earners without children, such as those earning minimum wage, the 
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proposed expansions would substantially raise earnings (by as much as 
20 percent), effectively countering the ground lost between 1980 and 
the present. However, even among the least skilled, the proportion earn-
ing the minimum wage is low, and thus for many the proposed expan-
sions will only subsidize part of annual earnings, with some low-skilled 
workers likely to be operating within the phaseout income range.
Table 7.11  Calculation of the EITC Benefi ts for a Couple (Each of 
Whom Earns $10,000 per Year) When Married and When 
Unmarried, Under the Existing System and Under Each 
Proposed Expansion
Number of children


































































NOTE: Figures in the table represent the EITC benefi t, under the existing system and 
under each proposal, that a two-earner couple, in which each spouse earns $10,000 
per year, would receive when married and when unmarried. The nature of the propos-
als is discussed in the note to Table 7.9 and in the text.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations based on the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) pro-
gram parameters for the 2005 tax year.
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To assess the overall effects of these expansions on take-home pay 
and their potential to draw certain groups into the labor market, I have 
tabulated average annual earnings for certain subgroups of the popula-
tion with extremely low employment rates and characterized the ben-
efi ts under each of these proposals as a proportion of annual earnings. 
The proportional increase, when combined with estimates of the supply 
responsiveness of these groups, provides ballpark estimates of the boost 
to employment rates one might expect from the expansions discussed 
here.16
Table 7.12 presents the proportional increases in annual income that 
would be generated by the proposed expansions for selective groups 
of low-skilled males with very low employment rates. All tabulations 
pertain to single, childless men with the additional characteristics indi-
cated in the table. The fi rst column demonstrates that the existing sys-
tem has virtually no effect on earnings (less than half of a percent) and 
thus likely has no effect on individual decisions to work among these 
men. The EHO/Hybrid proposal17 provides a notable increase in annual 
income, ranging from 2 to 6 percent, for all groups depicted; the larg-
est increase (6 percent) occurs for black high school dropouts between 
18 and 25 years of age. The enhanced EHO proposal has the largest 
proportional effects on income; it shows increases among young high 
school dropouts of 8 percent for all groups with the exception of Asian 
men, who would see a 5 percent increase. The Berlin proposal has the 
smallest effect on earnings among the new proposals; its effects range 
from 1 to 4 percent, and most men characterized in the table experience 
increases on the order of 2 percent.
How much of an increase in employment might we expect from 
these expansions? When combined with the labor supply elasticity es-
timates discussed above, the earnings increases in Table 7.12 are likely 
to have very modest effects on employment. For example, the EHO 
proposal is predicted to alter the employment rate of all black male 
dropouts by roughly 1 percentage point, while the larger enhanced EHO 
proposal might increase the employment rate of young black dropouts 
by as much as 2 percent. Given the lower responsiveness of less skilled 
men in the other racial or ethnic groups, the employment effects are 
likely to be even smaller.
As an overall assessment of the proposals, it is clear that no one 
proposal dominates, and that each has relative advantages and disad-
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vantages. The EHO proposal costs less and delivers more income to 
the lowest-earning workers.18 However, the expanded childless credit 
exacerbates the marriage penalty inherent in the current system. The 
Berlin proposal eliminates this penalty, but at a higher cost and for a 
less well-targeted program. The hybrid model, I believe, combines the 
strengths of both proposals, yielding a well-targeted expansion that re-
Table 7.12  EITC Credit as a Proportion of Annual Earnings for Select 
Groups of Single Childless Less-Educated Men, Under the 














































































NOTE: Figures provide the average credit under each system, divided by the average 
annual wage and salary earnings for workers in the given demographic group. All 
calculations apply to single, childless men. The nature of each proposal is described 
in the notes to Table 7.9 and in the text.
a For single childless men, the EHO and hybrid proposals are identical.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations based on data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Public 
Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the U.S. Census of Population and Housing.
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duces, or for some eliminates, the disincentive to marry. While the mar-
riage disincentives are pushed further up the earnings distribution, one 
can reasonably argue that the behavioral impact of the penalty is likely 
to be smaller for higher-income couples.
The small projected employment effects of these expansions are 
disappointing and suggest that substantially increasing employment 
through supply-side incentives would require a much bigger and cost-
lier expansion than the proposals analyzed here. Nonetheless, the pro-
posals represent considerable increases in the incomes of the workers at 
the very bottom of the distribution, increases that will greatly improve 
their material well-being and provide strong incentives for a small slice 
of the nation’s poorest adults to engage in legitimate work.
Policies to Remove Barriers to Employment for Ex-Offenders 
Spending time in prison or having a prior felony conviction in 
one’s history is becoming an increasingly common characteristic of 
low-skilled workers, especially for low-skilled minority men. While 
the causes of this increased interaction with the criminal justice sys-
tem are varied, the lion’s share of this development is attributable to 
changes in sentencing policy that have both increased the average time 
that an offender spends behind bars and enlarged the scope of behav-
ior punished by a spell of incarceration (Raphael and Stoll 2007). My 
analysis of employment trends found that only a small part of the de-
cline in employment rates among the least-skilled men can be explained 
by declining wages, suggesting the limits of policies designed to boost 
take-home earnings. Fully addressing the employment crises for these 
men requires directly addressing the barriers to employment created by 
one’s offi cial criminal past.
Facilitating the successful reentry of former inmates and felons into 
noninstitutionalized society is an extremely complex problem that will 
most likely require substantial investments in training, social services, 
employment services, and postrelease monitoring (see the discussions 
in Petersilia [2003] and Travis [2005]). The sheer size of this popu-
lation—roughly 600,000 inmates are released each year and nearly 5 
percent of the adult male population has served time—is indicative of 
the enormity of this challenge. Nonetheless, there are simple steps that 
the state and federal government could take that would not compromise 
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public safety yet would eliminate some of the challenges that former 
inmates and felons face in procuring employment and avoiding extreme 
poverty after their release.
To begin with, the summary disqualifi cation of former inmates 
and those with felony convictions from participating in federal 
public assistance programs and from receiving fi nancial aid for 
education should be reversed. Currently, those with prior drug fel-
ony convictions are prohibited from receiving federal fi nancial educa-
tion assistance. Moreover, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act made drug felons ineligible for food 
stamps and cash assistance for life. States could adopt the federal ban 
on food stamps and cash assistance as is, or pass legislation to modify 
or eliminate the ban. States are not authorized to eliminate the ban on 
fi nancial aid (Legal Action Center 2004).
The only possible rationale for such collateral punishment of drug 
offenders is that by enhancing punishment fewer people will engage in 
drug crimes. However, the deterrence effects of incarceration itself are 
hotly debated among those who study the determinants of crime (Lee 
and McCrary 2005; Levitt 1998), with much research suggesting that 
the likely effects are quite small. With this in mind, the deterrent effects 
of much more removed, and perhaps less salient, punishments such as 
a lifetime ban on food stamps receipt or becoming ineligible for Pell 
grants must certainly generate very little in the way of crime reduction. 
Such bans, however, do make it more diffi cult for released offenders 
to avoid extreme poverty and to turn their lives around. Financial aid 
through the Pell grant program is one of the main sources of assistance 
for those attending community college, an important source of training 
and secondary education for less-skilled adults. Food stamps very ef-
fectively provide basic assistance to meet the most fundamental needs 
of the poor. Banning former felons from participating in these programs 
is frankly counterproductive. Those states that maintain complete or 
partial bans on participation in public assistance should drop them, and 
the federal governments should reverse the ban on drug offenders re-
ceiving educational assistance.
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Employment bans based on former convictions and occupa-
tional licensing restrictions should be based on the content of one’s 
criminal record and not applied in a blanket manner. Moreover, 
when used, employment bans should be based on conviction rather than 
arrest records. Any bans on the employment of felons mandated by law 
should be based on the nature of one’s previous behavior as well as the 
time that has elapsed since the felony was committed. In their analy-
sis of the consideration that states give to criminal records, the Legal 
Action Center (2004) found that in nearly all states there is no standard 
or statute governing the consideration that employers and occupational 
licensing agencies are required to give to an employee who has a crimi-
nal history. In many states, employers can fi re anyone who is found to 
have a criminal history regardless of the gravity of the offense, the time 
since conviction, or the relevance of the past behavior to one’s current 
job responsibility. In addition, employers are generally free to consider 
and discriminate based upon one’s criminal history in hiring, with most 
states allowing employers to consider arrests not leading to conviction. 
Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll (2006) demonstrate that most employers 
of low-skilled labor check criminal records in some manner (either by 
directly asking the applicant, by paying a private fi rm, or by performing 
a query of the state criminal history repository), and that the proportion 
of employers that check has increased considerably over the decade 
of the 1990s. The high propensity to check, the complete discretion in 
considering past criminal records, and the high proportion of men with 
prior convictions all indicate a need for some governing standard that 
addresses the interests of employers but also recognizes the employ-
ment needs of former inmates and those with prior convictions. With 
this in mind, states should prohibit fi rms from considering prior arrests 
that did not result in a conviction when making decisions about the hir-
ing or fi ring of an employee. Moreover, publicly mandated employment 
bans of former felons for specifi c jobs as well as licensing bans should 
be based on the content of specifi c offenses or offender characteristics. 
In general, a more considerate and rational process for determining the 
suitability of former prisoners for employment in certain occupations 
is needed.
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We should invest more in labor market intermediaries that 
specialize in the reentry employment needs of recently released in-
mates. When asked, many employers express an extreme reluctance 
to hire former inmates. However, a sizable minority indicate that they 
are indeed willing to hire offenders and actually do so, as measured 
by recent hiring outcomes. Governmental as well as nonprofi t entities 
devoted to workforce development often serve an important informa-
tional role in matching clients to employers, which greatly minimizes 
the search costs for both parties. For a specifi c group of clients who face 
a stigma in searching for work, such job search assistance is likely to be 
particularly important.
Moreover, over time such intermediaries establish long-term rela-
tionships and credibility with employers and are thus more effective in 
placing their clients in employment. Because over the past decade many 
more people have been incarcerated for relatively less serious offenses, 
intermediaries should easily be able to identify the most job-ready can-
didates and offer up a steady supply of reentering former inmates who 
are prescreened and likely to be solid employees, or at least of compa-
rable quality to an employer’s average hire.
Given the scale of the fl ow of inmates out of prison each year (on 
the order of 600,000), there is a large potential role for agencies and 
nonprofi ts devoted to minimizing employment search costs, prescreen-
ing workers for employers, and aiding those who are reentering in be-
coming ready for conventional employment. 
States should incentivize desistance from criminal activity by 
expunging certain criminal records after a fi xed time period has 
elapsed. In a recent analysis, Kurlycheck, Brame, and Bushway (2006) 
raise the important question of whether unfettered employer access to 
criminal records can be justifi ed by the legitimate concerns of employ-
ers and the public. They assess whether the rate at which young offend-
ers desist from offending as time passes since the last offense merits 
limiting employer access to arrest and conviction information for suf-
fi ciently distant past offenses. The authors demonstrate that for a cohort 
of young men in Philadelphia the likelihood of a repeat offense declines 
precipitously as time accrues since the last offense. This pattern is con-
sistent with both a causal effect of staying clean and a remaining popu-
lation of former offenders that becomes increasingly selected with time 
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since the last offense (to be specifi c, selection occurs towards a low 
propensity to offend). For policy purposes, however, the exact source 
of this pattern is irrelevant. Based on this pattern, the authors argue 
that limiting employer access to criminal records beyond a certain time 
period may effectively limit the collateral consequences of prison while 
not necessarily exposing employers and the public to suffi ciently higher 
risk to warrant keeping access to the records open.
This simple proposal carries many advantages. Clearly, being able 
to procure and retain gainful employment is practically a necessary con-
dition for the successful reintegration of former inmates into noninsti-
tutionalized society. The expunging of one’s past offenses following a 
determined period of desistance will certainly improve the labor market 
prospects as well as the life prospects of former offenders. Moreover, 
the prospect of having one’s record wiped clean after a given period 
of desistance provides an incentive for former inmates to change their 
behavior.
Nonetheless, this proposal may have unintended negative conse-
quences if employers care about prior criminal activity and engage in 
indirect and imperfect screening practices. In other words, limiting an 
employer’s ability to access criminal records or to ask about criminal 
convictions may not preclude employers from using potential signals 
of earlier run-ins with the law in making hiring and promotion deci-
sions. At a minimum, employers may be able to effectively identify ex-
offenders through such signals as education, where one comes from, or 
through unaccounted-for gaps in one’s employment history. At worst, 
employers may systematically discriminate against workers who come 
from groups that they perceive to have a high propensity to offend, such 
as young black men (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2006). This important 
issue of how employers may respond to limits on access is key to de-
signing a policy that not only allows employers to take into account 
aspects of an individual’s history that are legitimately related to assess-
ing potential job performance, but also protects those who, through the 
passage of time, have demonstrated the irrelevance of their past infrac-
tions to their future performance.
There are several key choice variables that should be considered in 
designing an information policy that balances the ability of employers 
to have access to relevant information about applicants and employees 
with the interests of former offenders who have managed to stay out of 
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trouble. First and foremost among these choice variables is the length 
of the time limit placed on criminal history inquiries. If the limit that 
is set is too short, employers will not have confi dence in formal checks 
and thus will employ informal screens as a supplement, undoing much 
of the potential benefi t to ex-offenders from suppressing such informa-
tion in the fi rst place. To the extent that the limit is too long, few of-
fenders will benefi t and there will be little added incentive to stay clean 
because of the prospect of an expunged record. Kurlycheck, Brame, and 
Bushway (2006) focus on the seven-year limit set in the federal statute 
pertaining to the trucking industry. Clearly, more research on employer 
hiring practices with a focus on this specifi c question would greatly 
inform this choice.
A second choice variable concerns the starting point for the time 
period framing the criminal record. The authors advocate for a start 
date corresponding to the date of the most recent conviction, arguing 
that since few employers have access to incarceration information, time 
since incarceration is irrelevant. However, one can imagine that, with 
the knowledge that records are purged after seven years, employers 
may still downgrade applications from young men whom they suspect 
have served some time. Knowing that a clean criminal record check is 
consistent with either 1) never having offended, or 2) having offended 
and potentially served time but having had no contact with the criminal 
justice system for the past seven years, provides considerably more in-
formation than the alternative of ignoring incarceration.
A third important choice variable concerns whether there are some 
offenses that should never be purged. One might make the argument 
that someone who has served time for a felony sex offense should never 
work with children, or that workers with prior serious violent offenses 
should not be placed in jobs that involve providing security. Again, a 
better understanding of how employers consider such mitigating fac-
tors would provide useful information for forming a viable policy 
prescription.
Regardless, the growing numbers of noninstitutionalized felons 
raise important policy questions regarding reintegration and the man-
ner in which society can ease and facilitate the transition of former of-
fenders into productive and stable lives. Stable employment is clearly 
key. To the extent that we can improve the prospects of former offend-
ers without substantially harming the interests of employers, and while 
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providing a positive incentive to desist from criminal offending, we 
should do so.
CONCLUSION
The past three decades have not been kind to low-skilled work-
ers in the United States. In addition to low-skilled adults experiencing 
substantial real declines in hourly earnings, their employment rates, es-
pecially those for low-skilled minority men, have dropped to historic 
lows. Concurrently, the incarceration rates of these same adults have 
increased tremendously, to the point where for certain subgroups of the 
adult male population the likelihood of being institutionalized at any 
given point in time is nearly equal to the likelihood of being employed 
or the likelihood of being noninstitutionalized yet idle. 
These developments are clearly related. I have demonstrated the 
effects of declining wages on employment and incarceration rates. 
There is also a growing body of research suggesting a reverse causal 
link from prior incarceration to employment outcomes. This line of re-
search, combined with the disturbing incarceration trends that I have 
documented, indicates that the problems faced by ex-offenders repre-
sent an increasingly important and daunting challenge to antipoverty 
policy in the United States.
I have offered and analyzed two sets of policy responses by state and 
federal policymakers to these developments: 1) expanding the EITC for 
childless adults and noncustodial parents, and 2) taking steps to elimi-
nate some of the offi cial barriers to employment and impediments to 
reentry for former prison inmates and convicted felons. These clearly 
address only a small set of the problems faced by low-income adults. 
Yet action on these fronts would most certainly be helpful.
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Appendix 7A
Estimating Labor Supply 
Elasticities by Race and Gender
I use data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 census PUMS fi les to estimate 
the labor supply elasticities for men and women overall and for men and 
women by race and ethnicity. I then use these estimates to assess the degree 
to which changes in employment between 1980 and 2000 can be attributable 
to changes in wages. The supply elasticity estimates come from estimating 
the equation
(7A.1) Eexry = αy + βe + κx + γLnWexry + εexry ,
where Eexry is the employment rate for adults in our sample in education group e 
(less than high school, high school graduate, some college, college plus), in la-
bor market experience group x (5 years or less, 6 to 10 years, 11 to 15 years, 16 
to 20 years, 21 to 25 years, 26 to 30 years, 31 to 35 years, and 36-plus years), 
in racial group r (white, black, Asian, or Hispanic), and in year y (1980, 1990, 
and 2000), LnWexry is the corresponding average of log wages for members of 
this group, εexry is a mean-zero error term, αy represents a year-specifi c fi xed ef-
fect, and βe represents a fi xed effect for all adults in the education group e, and 
κx represents a fi xed effect for experience groups. The coeffi cient γ gives the 
responsiveness of employment for members of the group to a change in aver-
age log wages. The labor supply elasticity is defi ned by the equation
η = W ∂E  =  1     ∂E    .        E ∂W      E  ∂1nW  
Since γ provides an estimate of ∂E , calculating the elasticity requires dividing 
through by the employment rate. Since I’m dividing through by the average 
employment rate, the elasticity should be interpreted as the responsiveness of 
the group at the mean. The inclusion of year-fi xed effects as well as education- 
and experience-fi xed effects means that the elasticity estimates are identifi ed 
using variation in the changes in employment and earnings occurring within 
education and experience groups across racial or ethnic groups.
I estimate Equation (7A.1) separately for men and women to derive overall 
estimates of the responsiveness of male and female labor supply. I also esti-
mate the following modifi ed specifi cation
293
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(7A.2) Eexry = αy + βe + κx + δ × Blackexry + λ × Whiteexry + η × Asianexry 
  + γ0 LnWexry + γ1LnWexrt × Blackexry + γ2 LnWexry × Whiteexry 
  + γ3 LnWexry × Asianexry + εexry  ,
where Blackexry is a dummy variable equal to one if the group is black and zero 
otherwise, and Whiteexry and Asianexry are similar dummy variables indicating 
white and Asian demographic subgroups. This specifi cation allows the sup-
ply responsiveness to changes in wages to vary by race and ethnicity. The 
base coeffi cient γ0 indicates the responsiveness of Hispanic labor supply (the 
group omitted by the dummy variables) to changes in wages. The coeffi cient 
on the interaction term between the black dummy and log wages, γ1, indicates 
the degree to which black labor supply responsiveness differs from Hispanic 
labor supply responsiveness. The overall responsiveness of black labor supply 
requires adding the based coeffi cient, γ0, and the coeffi cient on the interaction 
term, γ1. Similar derivations would yield the labor supply responsiveness for 
whites and Asians. Note that the addition of race-specifi c dummy variables 
indicates that supply responsiveness is being estimated using variation in the 
changes in employment and earnings occurring within education and experi-
ence groups and within racial or ethnic groups. Again, converting the respon-
siveness parameter into an elasticity estimate requires dividing by the race-
specifi c mean employment rate.
Equations (7A.1) and (7A.2) are estimated using employment rates and 
earnings potential for all men and women, institutionalized as well as nonin-
stitutionalized. Thus, any impact of wage changes on institutionalization op-
erating through withdrawal from the formal labor force will be refl ected in the 
elasticity estimates.
Table 7A.1 presents the results of this analysis. For both men and women, I 
present estimation results for all adults in the sample and for adults with a high 
school degree or less. Parameter estimates for the coeffi cient on log wages and 
the interaction terms with log wages are presented in the top half of the table, 
while the implied elasticity estimates (the calculations represented graphically 
in Figures 7.1 and 7.2) are presented in the bottom half. The high elasticity 
estimates in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 use the largest race-specifi c estimates from the 
table, while the lowest are based on the smallest.
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Table 7A.1  Estimated Effects of Log Wages on the Likelihood of Being Employed at the Time of Interview for Men, 
and the Corresponding Implied Labor Supply Elasticities
Men Women
All men
Men with a high 
school diploma or less All women
Women with a high 
school diploma or less
























































































R2 0.892 0.930 0.885 0.918 0.902 0.924 0.884 0.903
N 449 449 239 239 447 447 239 239
(continued)
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296  NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Dashes indicate that the variable in question was not included in the regression specifi cation, 
therefore the data are not available. All models are based on regressions of the proportion of employment on average log wages based 
on demographic cells defi ned by year, level of educational attainment, labor market experience, and race/ethnicity. See text for the num-
ber of categories within each dimension and the specifi c defi nitions. All regressions include dummies for year-fi xed effects, education 
group–fi xed effects, experience group–fi xed effects, and race-fi xed effects and are based on data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses. 
All models are weighted by the sum of the sample weights within the defi ned cells. Supply elasticities are calculated by dividing the point 
estimate for the effect of log wages on employment by the average employment rate for the group in question.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations based on data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the U.S. Census 
of Population and Housing.
Table 7A.1 (continued)
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Appendix 7B
Assessing the Contribution of Declining 
Wages to Increases in Incarceration Rates
Let c be the likelihood that an individual chosen at random commits a 
crime, and p be the likelihood of being caught and convicted, conditional on 
committing a crime. Let θ be the rate at which inmates are released from pris-
on. Assume that c is a function of legitimate wages—i.e., c = c(w)—where 
c’(w) < 0. Raphael and Stoll (2007) demonstrate that under these assumptions 
the long-run equilibrium incarceration rate will be equal to 
(7B.1) Inc =     c(w)p     .           c(w)p + θ
In Equation (7B.1), incarceration increases in the transition probability from 
nonincarceration to incarceration (c(w)p) and decreases in the transition prob-
ability out of prison (θ). Differentiating Equation (7B.1) with respect to wages 
yields the expression
(7B.2) ∂Inc = ∂Inc × ∂c =       θ      × p ×  ∂c   ,  ∂w        ∂c      ∂w    (cp + θ)2           ∂w
where the dependence of c on w is suppressed for simplicity. In practice, cp is 
a very small number (generally below 0.003) while θ is relatively large (around 
0.5). If we set cp = 0, Equation (7B.2) is reduced to 
(7B.3) ∂Inc = ∂Inc × ∂c = 1 × p × ∂c   .  ∂w        ∂c     ∂w     θ           ∂w
If we assume that the time-served distribution is exponential, then the fi rst term 
provides the expected value of time served. Thus Equation (7B.3) becomes 
(7B.4)   ∆Incarceration = E(T ) × p × ∆Crime   .        ∆1nW        ∆LnW
Equation (7B.4) illustrates that the increase in incarceration caused by a de-
crease in wages will operate through the product of three factors. Moving from 
right to left on the right hand side of Equation (7B.4), a decline in wages will 
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increase criminal activity (that is to say,  ∆Crime will be negative). This in turn            ∆1nW 
will increase incarceration in proportion to the probability of being apprehend-
ed and sentenced, conditional on having committed a crime (the parameter, p). 
Finally, the ultimate effect on the overall incarceration rate will be larger the 
longer the expected amount of time the sentenced prisoner will serve (given 
by E(T ) in Equation [7B.4]). Thus with estimates for each of these factors, and 
with the wage trends presented in Table 7.3, one could estimate the proportion 
of the increase in institutionalization rates depicted in Table 7.5 that can be at-
tributable to declining wages. 
I draw estimates for each of these factors from various sources. Grogger 
(1998) estimates that the effect of a change in the natural log of hourly earnings 
on the likelihood of engaging in income-generating activity is approximately 
−0.25. I use this number for the change in crime caused by a change in log 
wages. Based on an analysis of criminal offending and incarceration among 
respondents of the NLSY79 data set, and the increased risk of incarceration 
over the past 20 years, I estimate that the likelihood of being caught and incar-
cerated among those who are actively engaged in income-generating criminal 
activity is 0.06 (see Raphael and Stoll [2007] for details). With regard to ex-
pected time served, the median inmate in the United States serves a term of 
slightly more than two years on a given prison spell. However, those offenders 
coaxed into criminal activity by declining wages are likely to commit fewer 
and less serious crimes relative to those already incarcerated. Thus, here I as-
sume that such marginal offenders that wind up in prison or jail serve no more 
than 1.5 years on average. Multiplying these three parameters suggests that 
the value of the derivative in Equation (7B.1) is equal to −0.0225. Multiplying 
this estimate by the actual change in wages for any given subgroup provides 
an estimate of the predicted increase in incarceration caused by the change in 
the group’s wages.
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Notes
I thank Timothy Bartik, Adam Carasso, Sheldon Danziger, Harry Holzer, Susan 
Houseman, Robert Reich, and Eugene Smolensky for their much-valued input.
 1.  Among the many explanations for the increase in earnings inequality over the 
past three decades, some of the most common include skill-biased technological 
change that has increased demand for high-skilled workers and reduced demand 
for low-skilled workers (Autor and Katz 1999), the erosion of the real value of 
the minimum wage (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996), increased interna-
tional trade with less-developed nations (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1997), and 
increased labor market competition from low-skilled immigrants (Borjas 2003; 
Freeman, Katz, and Borjas 1997).
 2. Between 1975 and 2005, the number of state and federal prisoners per 100,000 
U.S. residents increased from 111 to 491, constituting a 342 percent increase over 
this time period and a ratio of 4.42 inmates in 2005 to 1 inmate 30 years earlier. 
Between 1980 and 2005, the number of inmates in local and county jails increased 
from 81 per 100,000 to 252 per 100,000, a 211 percent increase and a ratio of 3.11 
inmates in 2005 to 1 inmate a quarter-century earlier. For details, see Raphael and 
Stoll (2007) and the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2007).
  3. The computation is based on four mutually exclusive race categories (non-Hispanic 
white, non-Hispanic black, non-Hispanic Asian, and Hispanic), nine educational 
attainment groups (no schooling, fourth grade or less, fi fth through eighth grade, 
ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth grades, one to three years of college, and col-
lege-plus), year (1980, 1990, or 2000), gender, and eight potential labor market 
experience groups (5 years or less, 6 to 10 years, 11 to 15 years, 16 to 20 years, 
21 to 25 years, 26 to 30 years, 31 to 35 years, and 36-plus years). I measure labor 
market experience by assuming an entry age of 16 for workers with less than a 
high school education, 18 for high school graduates, 20 for those with some col-
lege, and 22 for college graduates. For workers who are institutionalized, I assume 
that they have not worked in the previous year since for many of these workers the 
long form of the PUMS is completed using administrative records that are likely 
to vary in quality across institutions (Butcher and Piehl 2006).
  4. See Autor and Katz (1999) for a general discussion of wage trends in the United 
States. Juhn (2003) also computes wages for nonparticipants using the average 
wage of workers in matching demographic groups who work fewer than 13 weeks 
for the computation. Here I match to median wages for workers in one’s demo-
graphic group without placing a restriction on weeks worked, because preliminary 
analysis revealed workers with unusually high wages among those working few 
weeks. This latter pattern most likely refl ects measurement error in the “weeks 
worked” variable in the IPUMS-CPS database. 
  5. That is to say, the substitution effect associated with a decline in wages militates 
towards supplying less time to the labor market. The income effect of lower wag-
es, however, will in isolation induce one to supply more time to the labor market 
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and consume less free time. While these two effects are offsetting and thus imply 
that a decrease in wages may correspond to an increase in time supplied, much of 
the recent empirical research on the labor supply effects of diminished low-skilled 
wages suggests that the net effect on labor supply has been negative (Devereux 
2003; Juhn 1992, 2003; Pencavel 1997, 2002). 
  6. I calculate the predicted change in employment attributable to declining wages by 
multiplying the supply elasticity by the actual proportional decline in wages and 
by the base employment rate for each group in 1980.
  7. Of course, I am not saying that a year in prison is not costly. However, a year’s 
absence from the labor market during the beginning of one’s career would have 
only a small effect on accumulated experience.
  8. The California inmate population is roughly evenly distributed between whites, 
Hispanics, and blacks and is overwhelmingly male.
  9. Research on the employment effects of raising the minimum wage suggests that 
small increases result in negligible levels of job destruction, though large increas-
es do indeed reduce employment. The impact on total earnings accruing to mini-
mum-wage workers depends on how sensitive the demand for labor is to changes 
in wages. Most research suggests that demand for low-skilled workers is relatively 
inelastic, and thus an increase in the minimum wage leads to a total increase in the 
aggregate wage bill accruing to low-wage workers.
  10. In particular, for households with incomes in the region of the benefi ts schedule 
between the maximum benefi t threshold and the phaseout threshold, the EITC 
increases income without altering the marginal return to an additional hour of 
work. Simple economic theory predicts that such an increase in income would 
induce most people to work fewer hours. Workers whose income places them in 
the phaseout region of the benefi ts schedule have particularly strong incentives 
to work fewer hours, as the phaseout rate reduces the hourly wage by 21 percent 
while the benefi t provides a positive increase in income. Existing research sug-
gests that the negative incentive effects are particularly strong for secondary earn-
ings in two-parent families (Eissa and Hoynes 2004).
  11. In the report, From Poverty to Prosperity: A National Strategy to Cut Poverty 
in Half, The Center for American Progress (2007) proposes an expansion of the 
EITC nearly identical to that in Edelman, Holzer, and Offner (2006), with the ad-
dition that the childless tax credit be made available to all adults over age 24 and 
to adults between 18 and 24 who are not enrolled in school. The report also calls 
for an expansion of the phase-in rate for families with three or more children to 45 
percent. Currently, a phase-in rate of 40 percent applies to all families with two or 
more children. Thus, the proposal would not affect the phase-in rate for two-child 
families while increasing the rate for larger families.
  12. An alternative form of this hybrid would be to calculate benefi ts based on indi-
vidual income for some phase-in period (say the fi rst three years of marriage as 
proposed in Edelman, Holzer, and Offner [2006]).
  13. I use the March 2006 CPS to fi rst classify all adults by marital status and by 
whether they have dependents under 18. The four possibilities are then used to 
simulate tax fi ling units, where presumably single childless workers fi le inde-
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pendent returns, single parents fi le returns as a head of household, and married 
couples fi le joint returns. 
  14. Edelman, Holzer, and Offner (2006) assume a take-up rate of the childless benefi t 
of 0.67 and limit the credit to workers aged 21 to 64. Imposing these two restric-
tions lowers my cost estimates for this plan to $8.6 billion, quite close to the $9.8 
billion estimate offered by the authors.
  15. Under the EHO proposal, the highest possible phaseout income would be for a 
married couple with two or more children. Using the 2006 EITC phaseout total, 
total earnings must satisfy the equation Incomeh + 0.5 × Incomel ≤ 38,348, where 
the fi rst term is the income of the higher-earning spouse and the second term is the 
income of the lower-earning spouse. The highest possible total income that is still 
eligible for a benefi t is approximately $51,000. However, the benefi t accruing to 
such a household would be miniscule.
  16. This method basically ignores how the EITC affects the returns to the margin-
al hour. To be sure, for many workers who receive the EITC credit, the credit 
increases take-home pay while providing an incentive to reduce hours worked. 
With this caveat in mind, the calculated employment effects are offered as base-
line estimates for the purposes of bounding the employment effect from above. 
Nonetheless, the fact that most recipients receive the EITC as a once-per-year 
lump-sum payment may indicate that the connection between the benefi ts calcula-
tion parameters and the returns to additional work on the margin may be blurred 
for most. If this is the case, these simple calculations would provide reasonable 
fi rst approximations. 
  17. For “single with no dependents under 18,” the EHO proposal and the hybrid pro-
posal are identical.
  18. The analysis above looks at the proportion of income accruing to the deciles of 
the simulated tax-fi ling units. Analysis of the absolute dollars accruing to these 
deciles also reveals larger absolute benefi ts for households in the bottom three 
deciles.
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